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Abstract

plications in cryptography, such as in licensing softwares,
auctions and electronic voting. However, these types of
The notion of strong designated verifier signature was put signature schemes do not always achieve their goal, beforth by Jakobsson, Sako and Impagliazzo in 1996, but cause the signer does not know to whom he is proving the
the formal definition was defined recently by Saeednia, validity of a signature [4, 5].
Kremer and Markowitch in 2003 and revisited by LaguilTo overcome this problem, Jakobsson, Sako and Imlaumie and Vergnaud in 2004. In this paper, we firstly
pagliazzo proposed designated-verifier signature (DVS)
propose the notion of short strong designated verifier sigschemes in [8]. This signature scheme is the first nonnature scheme, and extend it to the short identity-based
interactive undeniable signature scheme that transforms
strong designated verifier scheme. Then, we propose the
Chaum’s scheme [2] into a non-interactive verification usfirst construction of short strong designated verifier siging a designated verifier proof. In a DVS scheme, the
nature scheme. We also extend our scheme to construct
signature provides authentication of a message without
a short identity-based strong designated verifier signature
providing a non-repudiation property of traditional sigscheme. The size of the signature of our schemes is the
natures. A designated verifier scheme can be used to
shortest compared to any existing schemes reported in
convince a single third party, i.e. the designated verithe literature. We provide formal security proofs for our
fier, and only the designated verifier who can be conschemes based on the random oracle model. Finally, we
vinced about its validity or invalidity of the signatures,
also discuss an extension of our scheme to construct a
due to the fact that the designated verifier can always
short strong designated verifier signature without random
construct a signature intended for himself that is indisoracle.
tinguishable from an original signature. There is no inKeywords: Designated verifier signature, identity based, teraction with the presumed signer required in this type
random oracle model, short signature, strong designated of signature schemes. More recently, following this idea,
verifier signature scheme
Galbraith and Mao proposed a non-interactive undeniable signature scheme based on RSA [6] in the multi-user
setting to have anonymity and invisibility. Libert and
1 Introduction
Quisquater [11] proposed an identity-based undeniable
The concept of undeniable signature was proposed by signature scheme that can be regarded as the identityChaum and van Antwerpen [3] to enable signers to have based version of Galbraith-Mao’s scheme using pairings.
complete control over their signatures. In this scheme, the
In [16], Steinfeld et al. extended the notion of
verification of the signer’s signature requires the partici- DVS scheme to a Universal Designated Verifier Signapation of the signer in an interactive protocol. The signer ture (UDVS) scheme, that allows any signature holder
can reject invalid signatures, but she must not be able to to convert it into a DVS specified to any designated verdeny valid signatures. Since the introduction of undeni- ifier of his choice. They also showed that bilinear maps
able signature schemes, there have been a wide range of allow an elegant construction of a UDVS scheme. Based
research covering a variety of different schemes for unde- on their ideas, Steinfeld et al. [17] proposed how to exniable signatures. For example, the recent work in [13] tend the classical Schnorr or RSA signature schemes into
studies the security of the FDH variant of undeniable sig- UDVS schemes and Laguillaumie and Vergnaud [9] pronature schemes. Undeniable signatures have various ap- posed a generic construction of DVS scheme from any

International Journal of Network Security, Vol.6, No.1, PP.82–93, Jan. 2008

bilinear maps.
In [8], Jakobsson et al. also briefly discussed a
stronger notion called a strong designated verifier signature (SDVS) scheme. The strongness property required
in this notion refers to the requirement of the designated
verifier to use his secret key to verify the validity or invalidity of a signature. Therefore, only given the public
keys of the potential signers and verifier, nobody (except
the designated verifier) can determine who is the actual
signer. This notion was formally defined and strengthened
by Saeednia et al. in [15] and strengthen by Laguillaumie
and Vergnaud [9]. Given an SDVS signature and two potential signing public keys, it is computationally infeasible
for an eavesdropper to determine under which of the two
secret keys the signature was performed. Following Saeednia et al.’s work, Susilo et al. proposed an identity-based
(or ID-based, for short) SDVS scheme based on pairings
in [18].
The definition of the ring signatures was formalized by
Rivest, Shamir and Tauman in [14]. They also showed
how to achieve a designated verifier signature scheme
where two participants in a ring signature collaborate and
generate a signature. We should note that the construction does not satisfy the strongness property of SDVS
scheme, since the secret key of the verifier is not required
to verify the authenticity of the signature. Following this
idea, multi-designated verifier signature scheme was proposed in [10].
Throughout this paper, let log2 (n) denote the length
of the binary representation of n. p|q means p divides
q. The ring of integers modulo a number p is denoted
by ZZp , and its multiplicative group, which contains only
the integers relatively prime to p, by ZZ∗p . The notation ||
means concatenation.
In this paper, we propose the first construction of short
strong designated verifier signature scheme. Compared to
the existing schemes [8, 9, 15], our scheme is very efficient
in terms of signature generation and the signature length.
In particular, the signature length of our scheme is only
log2 (q), which is the shortest compared to the existing
schemes. At the same time, we do not require any pairing
operation, in contrast to the construction proposed in [9].
We note that it is arguably that shortness of signature
schemes is not a notion rather than a property of signature
schemes.
We also extend our scheme to construct a short
identity-based strong designated verifier signature
scheme. In contrast to the previous construction in [18],
our scheme produces a significantly shorter signature
length, and it requires less computational operations.
Our schemes are simple and efficient, but as we shall
show in this paper, our schemes achieve all the required
properties of (identity based) strong designated verifier
signature schemes. We provide security proofs for our
schemes based on the random oracle model. We also
provide a variant of our scheme that produces signature
length less than log2 (q). Finally, we show a modification
of our scheme to construct an SDVS scheme without
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random oracle.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the
next section, we will provide some preliminaries and background required throughout the paper. In Section 3, we
review the definition of SDVS schemes, and their IDbased variant. In Section 4, we introduce the new notion
of short strong designated verifier signature schemes and
their identity-based variant. In Section 5, we provide our
concrete short SDVS scheme, together with its security
proof. In Section 6, we present our concrete short IDbased SDVS scheme and its security proof. We compare
the performance of our schemes to other existing schemes
in Section 7. We will also discuss variants of our scheme
that produce shorter signature length and a scheme that
is secure under the standard model. Finally, Section 8
concludes the paper.

2
2.1

Preliminaries
Basic Concepts on Bilinear Pairings

Let G1 be a cyclic additive groups generated by P , whose
order is a prime q. Let GT be a cyclic multiplicative group
with the same order q. Let ê : G1 ×G1 → GT be a bilinear
mapping with the following properties:
1) Bilinearity: ê(aP, bQ) = ê(P, Q)ab for all P, Q ∈
G1 , a, b, ∈ ZZq .
2) Non-degeneracy: There exists P, Q ∈ G1 such that
ê(P, Q) 6= 1GT .
3) Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to
compute ê(P, Q) for all P, Q ∈ G1 .
Bilinear pairing instance generator is defined as a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm IG that takes as input
a security parameter ` and returns a uniformly random tuple param = (q, G1 , GT , ê, P ) of bilinear parameters, including a prime number q of size greater than ` (q ≥ 2` ), a
cyclic additive group G1 of order q, a multiplicative group
GT of order q, a bilinear map ê : G1 × G1 → GT and a
generator P of G1 . For a group G of prime order, we denote the set G∗ = G\{O} where O is the identity element
of the group.
The related complexity assumptions are as follows.
1) Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Problem.
Given a randomly chosen P ∈ G1 , as well as aP, bP
and cP (for unknown randomly chosen a, b, c ∈ ZZ∗q ),
compute ê(P, P )abc . For the BDH problem to be
hard, G1 and GT must be chosen so that there is
no known algorithm for efficiently solving the DiffieHellman problem in either G1 or GM . We note that
if the BDH problem is hard for a pairing ê, then it
follows that ê is non-degenerate.
2) Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH)
Problem. Given a randomly chosen P ∈ G1 , as well
as aP, bP, cP (for unknown randomly chosen a, b, c ∈
ZZ∗q ) and h ∈ GM , decide whether h = ê(P, P )abc .
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3) Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (Gap BDH)
Problem. Given a randomly chosen P ∈ G1 , as
well as aP, bP and cP (for unknown randomly chosen a, b, c ∈ ZZ∗q ), compute ê(P, P )abc with the help of
the DBDH oracle.
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Let P (A, B) be a protocol for Alice to prove the correctness
of statement Θ to a designated verifier, Bob. P (A, B) is
called to be a strong designated verifier protocol if anyone
other than Bob can produce identically distributed transcripts that are indistinguishable from those of P (A, B)
for everyone, except for Bob.

4) Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) ProbTo achieve SDVS schemes, the general assumption is
lem. Given a randomly chosen P ∈ G1 , as well as
∗
the
verifier has constructed his public key and made it
aP, bP , for unknown a, b ∈ ZZq , compute abP .
available publicly (with a certificate from the trusted au5) Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem. thority to make sure the authenticity of the public key).
Given a randomly chosen P ∈ G1 , aP, bP and h ∈ That means, before a signature can be designated to the
?
G1 , decide whether h = abP . It is known that DDH designated verifier, he has to setup his public key accordin G1 is easy and can be solved in polynomial time. ingly. Without this setup, a signer cannot designate her
signature to the designated verifier.
6) Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) Problem.
Recently, this notion has been extended to an ID-based
A prime order group G1 is a GDH group if there SDVS scheme in [18]. The new notion was introduced to
exists an efficient polynomial-time algorithm that reduce the restriction of having the designated verifier’s
solves the DDH problem in G1 and there is no prob- public key setup before the signature can be designated
abilistic polynomial-time algorithm that solves the by the signer. Hence, the signer can always designate her
CDH problem with non-negligible probability. The signature to anyone in the system without the need of
Diffie-Hellman problem on such a group is called any interaction with the receiver beforehand. The only
Gap Diffie-Hellman Problem, that states given a ran- requirement is to have the ID of the receiver published.
domly chosen generator g, and g a , g b for unknown The notion of ID-based SDVS schemes from [18] is as
a, b ∈ ZZ∗q , compute g ab with the help of the DDH follows.
oracle.
Definition 2. ID-based Strong Designated Verifier
Signatures (ID-based SDVS) [18]
2.2 Collision-resistant Hashing
Let P (A, B) be a protocol for Alice to prove the truth of
Let H be a hash function and an algorithm A has advan- the statement Θ to Bob. We require that Alice can just
tage  in finding the collision of H if Pr[A = (m0 , m1 ) : obtain Bob’s ID from the system and use this information
m0 6= m1 , H(m0 ) = H(m1 )] = . We say H is a collision- to show the correctness of Θ to Bob. P (A, B) is said to be
resistant hashing if the probability  is negligible for any an ID-based strong designated verifier protocol if anyone
polynomially bounded algorithm A.
can produce identically distributed transcripts that are indistinguishable from those of P (A, B) for everyone, except
for Bob.

3

Review of (ID-based) Strong
Designated Verifier Signatures
Schemes

The notion of SDVS schemes was briefly mentioned in [8].
They suggested that “in order to make protocols strong
designated verifier, transcripts can be probabilistically encrypted using the public key of the intended verifier”.
This notion has recently relaxed in [9] that proved that using an additional IND-CCA2 public key encryption layer is
actually sufficient to create any DVS scheme strong. This
“generic” construction implies that the notion of SDVS
schemes relies on the existence of an additional IND-CCA2
public key encryption scheme.
In [15], the notion of SDVS schemes was formalized by
requiring anyone to produce identically distributed transcripts that are indistinguishable from the original transcript that was produced by the original signer. For completeness, we review their definition as follows. We will
provide the formal model of SDVS schemes in Section 4.

Although they provide a generic construction of IDbased SDVS schemes in [18], their main scheme is essentially an ID-based version of Saeednia et al.’s scheme [15].

4

Short (ID-based) Strong Designated
Verifier
Signatures
Schemes

In this section, we present our new notion of short SDVS
schemes (SSDVS) (as noted earlier, we stress that it is
arguably that shortness of signature schemes is not a notion rather than a property of signature schemes). We
also extend our notion to its ID-based variant to create
the short ID-based SDVS scheme (SIDSDVS).

4.1

Short Strong Designated Verifier Signatures

There exist two participants in the system, namely Alice
Definition 1. Strong Designated Verifier Signa- and Bob, who act as the sender and the receiver (or the
tures (SDVS) [15]
designated verifier), respectively. We assume that both
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Alice and Bob have setup their public key setting, and we
denote SKi , PKi as a pair of secret key and public key
for user i, where i ∈ {A, B}. An SSDVS scheme consists
of three essential algorithms as follows.
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Definition 3. We say that an SSDVS scheme is EFCMA secure under a chosen message attack if the probability of success of any polynomially bounded adversary
in the above game is negligible. In other words,

−CMA
• Signature Generation: A deterministic algorithm
SuccEF
SSDV S,A (`) ≤ .
that uses the signer’s secret key, the designated verifier’s public key and a message m to generate a sig- Privacy of Signer’s Identity:
We give a formal definition of the privacy of signer’s idennature σ. That is, σ ← Sign(SKA , PKB , m).
tity (or the strongness property of the DVS scheme) under
• Signature Verification: A deterministic algo- a chosen message attack (PSI-CMA) defined using the folrithm that accepts a message m, a signature σ, the lowing games between an adversary A and a challenger
signer’s public key PKA and a secret key SKB and C.
returns True if the signature is correct, or ⊥ other• Setup: Input a security parameter `, C runs the alwise. That is, {True, ⊥} ← Verify(PKA , SKB , m, σ).
gorithm to obtain the secret key and public key pair
• Transcript Simulation: An algorithm that is run
(SKA0 , PKA0 ), (SKA1 , PKA1 ), (SKB , PKB ) to repby the verifier to produce identically distributed tranresent the two signers, A0 , A1 , and the receiver, B,
scripts that are indistinguishable from the original
respectively.
protocol.
• Sign Queries: A can request a signature on a message
In addition to the above main algorithms, we also require
m for the signer Ar (r ∈ {0, 1}), and the designated
the following.
verifier B. In respond, C outputs a signature σ for a
message m.
• Correctness.
All signatures that are generated correctly by Sign algorithm, will always pass
• Verify Queries: A can request a signature verification
the verification algorithm. That is, Pr(T rue ←
on a pair (m, σ) for signer Ar , r ∈ {0, 1}, and the
Verify(PKA , SKB , m, Sign(SK A , PKB , m))) = 1.
designated verifier B. In respond, C outputs True if
it is correct, or ⊥ otherwise.
• Transcript Simulation Generation. We require
that the verifier, who holds the secret key SKB can
• Output: Finally, A outputs a target message m∗ ∈
always produce identically distributed transcripts
{0, 1}∗ and provides it to C. C performs a coin tossthat are indistinguishable from the original protocol
ing to select a random r ∈ {0, 1} and computes
via the Transcript Simulation algorithm.
σ ∗ ← Sign(SKr , PKB , m) and returns it to A. A
must perform an educated guess to obtain the corUnforgeability of SSDVS:
rect value of r. During this time, A can request Sign
We provide a formal definition of existential forgeability
and Verify queries to C, for any m 6= m∗ and σ 6= σ ∗ .
of an SSDVS scheme under a chosen message attack (EFAfter all the queries, A outputs a bit r0 .
CMA). It is defined using the following games between an
adversary A and a challenger C.
The Advantage of an PSI-CMA adversary A to win the
game is defined by
• Setup: Input the security parameter `, C runs the
P SI−CMA
0
algorithm to obtain the secret key and public key pair
AdvSSDV
S,A (`) = |2 Pr[r = r] − 1|.
(SKA , PKA ), (SKB , PKB ) to represent the signer,
A, and the receiver, B, respectively.
Definition 4. We say that an SSDVS scheme is a strong
DVS scheme under a chosen message attack if the advan• Sign Queries: A can request a signature on a message
tage of any polynomially bounded adversary in the above
m for the signer A, and the designated verifier B. In
game is negligible. In other words,
respond, C outputs a signature σ for a message m.
PSI −CMA
AdvSSDV
S,A (`) ≤ .
• Verify Queries: A can request a signature verification

on a pair (m, σ) for signer A, and the designated
verifier B. In respond, C outputs True if it is correct,
or ⊥ otherwise.

4.2

Short ID-based Strong Designated
Verifier Schemes

• Output: Finally, A outputs a new pair (m∗ , σ ∗ ), The notion of short ID-based SDVS scheme is similar to
where m∗ has never been queried during the Sign the definition of the short SDVS scheme defined in section
4.1. There exist two participants in the system, namely
Queries and σ ∗ is a valid signature.
Alice and Bob, who act as the sender and the receiver
The success probability of an adversary to win the game (or the designated verifier), respectively. All participants
is defined by
have their identity, IDi , i ∈ {A, B}, published. There ex−CMA
SuccEF
SSDV S,A (`).
ists a Private Key Generator (PKG) in the system that
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will provide a secret key to a participant during an Extract
algorithm. Each participant’s secret key is denoted by
SKIDi , which is derived from the Extract algorithm. Without losing generality, we assume that A is the signer and
B is the designated verifier. A short SIDSDVS scheme
(SIDSDVS) consists of the following algorithms.
• Signature Generation. A deterministic algorithm
that uses the signer’s secret key, the ID of the designated verifier and a message m to generate a signature σ. That is, σ ← IDSign(IDB , SKIDA , m).
• Signature Verification. A deterministic algorithm that receives a message m, a signature σ,
a verifier’s secret key SKIDB and a sender’s identity IDA , that returns True if the signature is
correct, or ⊥ otherwise. That is, {T rue, ⊥} ←
IDVerify(IDA , SKIDB , m, σ).
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• Output: Finally, A outputs a new pair (m∗ , σ ∗ ) with
the signer IDi∗ and the designated verifier IDj ∗ such
that:
1) A didn’t submit IDi∗ or IDj ∗ during the Key
Extraction Queries.
2) m∗ has never been queried during the IDSign
Queries with the signer IDi∗ and the designated
verifier IDj ∗
3) σ ∗ is a valid signature of the message m∗ with
the signer IDi∗ and the designated verifier IDj ∗ .
The success probability of an adversary to win the game
is defined by
−CMA
SuccEF
SIDSDV S,A (`).

Definition 5. We say that a short SIDSDVS scheme
(SIDSDVS) is existentially unforgeable under a chosen
message attack if the probability of success of any polyno• Transcript Simulation. An algorithm that is run mially bounded adversary in the above game is negligible.
by the verifier to produce identically distributed tran- In other words,
scripts that are indistinguishable from the original
−CMA
protocol.
SuccEF
SIDSDV S,A (`) ≤ .
In addition to the above main algorithms, we also require Privacy of Signer’s Identity
the following.
We give a formal definition of the privacy of signer’s identity (or the strongness property of the Identity-based DVS
• Correctness. All signatures that are generated scheme) under a chosen message attack (PSI-CMA) decorrectly by IDSign algorithm, will always pass fined using the following games between an adversary A
the verification algorithm. That is, Pr(T rue ← and a challenger C.
IDVerify(IDA , SKIDB , m, IDSign(IDB , SKIDA , m))) =
1.
• Setup: C runs this algorithm to generate system’s
parameter.
• Transcript Simulation Generation. We require
• Key Extraction Queries: A can request the secret key
that the verifier, who holds the secret key SKIDB can
of the user with the identity IDi . C will return SKIDi
always produce identically distributed transcripts
as the answer.
that are indistinguishable from the original protocol
via the Transcript Simulation algorithm.
• IDSign Queries: A can request a signature on a message m for a signer IDi , and the designated verifier
Unforgeability of SIDSDVS:
IDj . In respond, C outputs a signature σ for a mesWe provide a formal definition of existential unforgeabilsage m.
ity of a short SIDSDVS scheme (SIDSDVS) under a chosen message attack. It is defined using the following game
• IDVerify Queries: A can request a signature verificabetween an adversary A and a challenger C.
tion on a pair (m, σ) for signer IDi , and the designated verifier IDj . In respond, C outputs True if it is
• Setup: C runs this algorithm to generate system’s
correct, or ⊥ otherwise.
parameter.
• Key Extraction Queries: A can request the secret key
of the user with the identity IDi . C will return SKIDi
as the answer.

• Output: Finally, A outputs a target message m∗ ∈
{0, 1}∗ with the possible signer IDA0 , IDA1 and designated verifier IDB to C. The requirements are that

• IDSign Queries: A can request a signature on a message m for a signer IDi , and the designated verifier
IDj . In respond, C outputs a signature σ for a message m.

1) A didn’t submit IDA0 , IDA1 or IDB during the
Key Extraction Queries.

• IDVerify Queries: A can request a signature verification on a pair (m, σ) for signer IDi , and the designated verifier IDj . In respond, C outputs True if it is
correct, or ⊥ otherwise.

2) m∗ has never been queried during the IDSign
Queries with the signer IDAr , r ∈ {0, 1} and the
designated verifier IDB .
C performs a coin tossing to select a random r and
computes σ ∗ ← IDSign(IDB , SKIDAr , m∗ ) and returns
it to A. A must perform an educated guess to the

International Journal of Network Security, Vol.6, No.1, PP.82–93, Jan. 2008
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xB
– Compute k = yA
(mod p).

correct value of r. During this time, A can request
IDSign and IDVerify queries to C with the requirements that

– Compute σ̂ = H(m||k).

Note that the signature is indistinguishable from the
1) m∗ can’t be queried during the IDSign Queries
original signature created by Alice.
with the signer IDAr , r ∈ {0, 1} and the designated verifier IDB .
Correctness:
2) (m∗ , σ ∗ ) can’t be queried during the IDVerify The correctness of the verification algorithm is due to the
Queries with the signer IDAr , r ∈ {0, 1} and the following.
designated verifier IDB .
xB
xA
σ = H(m||yA
) = H(m||g ab ) = H(m||yB
).
The Advantage of an PSI-CMA adversary A to win the
game in SIDSDVS is defined by
We omit the modulus operation when it is clear from the
context.
P SI−CMA
0
AdvSIDSDV
(`)
=
|2
Pr[r
=
r]
−
1|.
Remarks:
S,A
We note that at a glance, the proposed scheme is similar
Definition 6. We say that a short SIDSDVS scheme to the notion of keying hash function as introduced in [1].
(SIDSDVS) is a strong IDDVS scheme under a cho- In a keying hash function, the key is a random and sesen message attack if the advantage of any polynomially cure value known only to the parties. In our scheme, each
bounded adversary in the above game is negligible. In party can use her/his secret key to obtain the value of k.
other words,
One can also find that if the value k is published by the
PSI −CMA
AdvSIDSDV
S,A (`) ≤ .
signer A, anyone can obtain a valid signature and B will
not believe that the signature is sent by A. However, as
explained
earlier, the purpose of our scheme is that the
5 A
Concrete
Short
SDVS
signer A uses the designated verifier signature to convince
Scheme
B, and only B will believe with the validity of the signature. In this sense, A will not publish the value k and the
In this section, we present our concrete construction of a attack model proposed in [12] (which is related to the delshort SDVS scheme. The description of our scheme is as egation of the signature) is not applicable to this model.
follows.
We also need to point out that the scheme proposed in [12]
• Setup: Let p be a large prime and q a prime divi- is not a strong DVS scheme rather than a DVS scheme,
sor of p − 1. Let g be an element in ZZ∗ of order since it does not provide the signer’s privacy.
p

q. Let p, q ≥ 2` , where ` is the security parameter.
Let H : {0, 1}∞ → ZZ∗q be a cryptographic collisionresistant hash function. The signer, Alice, randomly
selects her secret key xA ∈ ZZ∗q and computes her
public key as yA = g xA (mod p). Here, PKA := yA .
The designated verifier, Bob, also selects his secret
key xB ∈ ZZ∗q and sets his public key as yB = g xB
(mod p). Here PKB := yB . Let SKA := xA and
SKB := xB .

5.1

Security Analysis

Theorem 1. Our SSDVS scheme is a designated verifier
signature scheme.

Proof. We note that the verification algorithm requires
xB
yA
, where xB is the secret key of the designated verifier
B. Hence, B can always “simulate” a valid signature
• Sign: To sign a message m ∈ {0, 1}∞ for Bob, Alice
by producing a valid signature himself. This is achieved
performs the following.
xB
by constructing a signature σ, where σ = H(m, yA
).
xA
Note that the signature produced by B is indistinguish– Compute k = yB (mod p).
able from the one that was produced by A. Hence, no
– Compute σ = H(m||k).
third party can be convinced with the validity or invalidity of this signature other than the designated verifier
The signature on a message m is σ.
himself. If the designated verifier has not generated such
• Verify: To verify the validity of a signature σ on a a signature, then he will believe that the signature was
xB
message m, Bob computes k = yA
(mod p) and indeed generated by the signer A.
tests whether
?
H(m||k) = σ
Theorem 2. (Unforgeability) Let A be an EF-CMAadversary against our SSDVS scheme with success probaholds with equality. If it holds, then output True.
−CMA
bility SuccEF
SSDV S, A . In time t he can make qH queries to
Otherwise, output ⊥.
the H : {0, 1}∗ → ZZ∗q (q ≥ 2` , ` is the system’s security
• Transcript Simulation: Bob can produce the signature parameter), qS queries to the signing algorithm and qV to
σ̂ intended for himself, by performing the following. the verifying algorithm, then there exists an algorithm B
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who can use A to solve an instance of the GDH problem
with the probability:
−CMA
SuccGDH
≥ SuccEF
B
SSDV S, A −

qV
.
2` − qH − qS

• Transcript Simulation: Bob can produce the signature
σ̂ intended for himself for a message of his choice.
This is done as follows.
– Compute k = ê(QIDA , SIDB ).

Proof. See Appendix.

– Compute σ = H1 (m||k).

Theorem 3. (Privacy of Signer’s Identity) Let A
We note that the resulting signature is indistinguishbe an PSI-CMA-adversary against our SSDVS scheme
P SI−CMA
able from the original one that was produced by Alwith advantage AdvSSDV S, A . In time t he can make qH
ice.
∗
queries to the H : {0, 1}∗ → ZZq (q ≥ 2` , ` is the system’s
security number) , qS queries to the signing algorithm and
qV to the verifying algorithm, then there exists an algo- Correctness:
rithm B who can use A to solve an instance of the GDH The correctness of the verification algorithm is due to the
following.
problem with the probability:
1
qV
P SI−CMA
AdvSSDV
.
S, A − `
2
2 − qH − qS

=
=

H1 (m||ê(QIDB , SIDA ))
H1 (m||ê(QIDB , sQIDA ))

Proof. See Appendix.

=
=

H1 (m||ê(sQIDB , QIDA ))
H1 (m||ê(SIDB , QIDA ))

6

=

H1 (m||ê(QIDA , SIDB )).

SuccGDH
≥
B

A Concrete Short SIDSDVS
Scheme

In this section, we present our concrete construction of short SIDSDVS scheme (SIDSDVS). The SIDSDVS scheme consists of the following algorithms.
• Setup: PKG generates two groups (G1 , +) and (GT , ·)
of prime order q (q ≥ 2` , ` is the system’s security
number) and a bilinear pairing ê : G1 × G1 → GT ,
together with an arbitrary generator P ∈ G1 . He
also selects his secret key ( or master key) s ∈ Z∗q
and set Ppub = sP . Finally, two cryptographically collision-resistant hash functions are selected,
H0 : {0, 1}∞ → G1 and H1 : {0, 1}∞ → Z∗q .
The system parameters and their descriptions are
(G1 , GT , q, ê, P, Ppub , H0 , H1 ). Each user has his/her
identity, IDi , published. In this scenario, Alice has
published her identity, IDA , and Bob has published
his identity, IDB . Let QID = H0 (ID) and the user’s
secret key is computed as SID = sQID .
• IDSign: To sign a message m ∈ {0, 1}∞ for Bob, Alice
performs the following.

σ

We note that ê(QIDB , SIDA ) = ê(SIDB , QIDA ) because of
the properties of bilinear pairings.

6.1

Security Analysis

Using the same technique as we used in Section 5.1, we
obtain the following theorems.
Theorem 4. Our SIDSDVS is a designated verifier signature scheme.
Theorem 5. (Unforgeability) Let A be an EF-CMAadversary against our SIDSDVS scheme with success
−CMA
probability SuccEF
SIDSDV S, A . In time t he can make qH
queries to the H1 : {0, 1}∗ → ZZ∗q (q ≥ 2` , ` is the system’s
security parameter), qS queries to the signing algorithm
and qV to the verifying algorithm, then there exists B who
can use A to solve an instance of the Gap BDH problem
with probability:
BDH
−CMA
SuccGap
≥ SuccEF
B
SIDSDV S, A −

2`

qV
.
− qH − qS

– Compute k = ê(QIDB , SIDA ).

Theorem 6. (Privacy of Signer’s Identity) Let A
be an PSI-CMA-adversary against our SIDSDVS scheme
P SI−CMA
with advantage AdvSIDSDV
S, A . In time t he can make
The signature on a message m is σ.
qH queries to the H1 : {0, 1}∗ → ZZ∗q (q ≥ 2` , ` is the sys• IDVerify: To verify the validity of a signature σ on a tem’s security number) , qS queries to the signing algorithm and qV to the verifying algorithm, then there exists
message m, Bob tests whether
B who can use A to solve an instance of the Gap BDH
?
problem with probability:
H1 (m||ê(QIDA , SIDB )) = σ
– Compute σ = H1 (m||k).

holds with equality. If it does, then output True.
Otherwise, output ⊥.

BDH
SuccGap
≥
B

qV
1
P SI−CMA
AdvSIDSDV
.
S, A − `
2
2 − qH − qS
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7

Efficiency Comparison

In this section, we compare efficiency of the proposed
schemes with the existing schemes. We will compare the
efficiency of the schemes based on the length of the signature and the number of operations required.
In Table 1, we compare our scheme against the most
efficient strong DVS scheme proposed in [9] and [15]. In
this comparison, we set q = 160 bits for Saeednia et al.’s
scheme [15], Laguillaumie and Vergnaud’s scheme [9] and
our SSDVS scheme.
As shown in Table 1, our signature length is the shortest (only 160 bits). In terms of the number of operations
required, our scheme only requires 2 exponentiations in
ZZ∗q and 2 hash operations, and there is no pairing operation required. It is clear that our scheme outperforms
Saeednia et al.’s and Laguillaumie and Vergnaud’s scheme
[9]. In particular, Laguillaumie and Vergnaud’s scheme
requires bilinear pairings operations which are computationally costly.
In Table 2, we compare our SIDSDVS scheme against
the ID-based DVS scheme proposed in [18], which is an
ID-based version of [15]. We assume that the bit length
of the element in G1 is 1024 bits, and q = 160 bits.
It is clear from Table 2 that our scheme outperforms
Susilo et al.’s scheme [18]. Our scheme only requires
2 pairing operations and 2 hash operations, while the
scheme in [18] requires 3 pairings, 1 addition, 2 multiplication in G1 , 3 exponentiation in G2 and 2 hash operations.

7.1

Further Discussions

More Efficient Schemes:
It is easy to see that the signature length of our scheme
is based on the hash function employed, H1 . Hence, if
we replace the hash function definition of H1 with the
following
H1 : {0, 1}∞ → ZZ∗2`
where ` is the security parameter, then our signature
length will be 2` . Assuming such a hash function exists and secure, then our signature scheme becomes more
efficient.
A Scheme without Random Oracle:
We shall point out that a variant of our scheme can be
used to construct an SSDVS (SIDSDVS) scheme without
random oracle. Without losing generality, we illustrate
the modification in a non-ID-based setting. The signature
and verification algorithm are modified as follows.
1) Sign: To sign a message m ∈ {0, 1}∞ for Bob, Alice
performs the following.
xA
• Compute k = yB
(mod p).

• Compute σ = Ek (m), where E denotes a symmetric key encryption, such as AES.
The signature on a message m is σ.

2) Verify: To verify the validity of a signature σ on a
xB
message m, Bob computes k = yA
and tests whether
?

σ = Ek (m)
holds with equality. If it holds, then output True.
Otherwise, output ⊥.
One can view this scheme as a standard MAC scheme
that uses a shared key k. The security of this scheme
is based on the CDH assumption and the security of the
underlying symmetric key encryption scheme Ek .

8

Conclusion

In this paper, we presented the first short strong designated verifier signature scheme and its ID-based variant.
Our schemes outperform the existing schemes known in
the literature. Our construction has opened a new area
of research, namely short strong designated verifier signature schemes, which have never been investigated before.
Unlike the previous constructions, our schemes only produce 160 bits (if q = 160) signature which is very short
compared to the existing schemes. We provided security
proofs for our schemes based on the random oracle model.
We also discussed variants of our scheme which is more
efficient and provably secure under the standard assumption.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2 Given a random instance (g, g a , g b )
of the Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) problem, we will show
how B can use A to obtain the value of g ab with the help
of Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Oracle. In the proof,
we regard the hash function as the random oracle H.
B will simulate all the oracles in the proof to answer
A0 s queries. In the simulation, B will maintain a list
which is called H-List to record the hash queries and the
corresponding values. This H-List consists of the items
(m, r, σ, coin), where (m, r) is the input of the hash, σ is
the output of the hash, coin = 1 if r = g ab and coin = 0
if r 6= g ab (This is determined by the DDH oracle). We
assume that A is well-behaved in the sense that A will
never repeat the same queries in our simulation.
• Game0 We consider an EF-CMA adversary A with
−CMA
the success probability SuccEF
SSDV S, A . The signers,
Alice , selects her secret key SKA = xA ∈ ZZ∗q , computes yA = g xA and sets her public key PKA = yA .
The designated verifier, Bob, also selects his secret
key SKB = xB ∈ ZZ∗q , computes yB = g xB sets his
public key PKB = yB .
The adversary A, with yA and yB , can query
the hash oracle H, the signing oracle S and ver-
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ify oracle V .
A outputs (m∗ , σ ∗ ), such that
∗
∗
Verify(m , σ , SKB , PKA ) = 1.
Let qH , qS , qV denote the number of queries to the
H, signing algorithm and verifying algorithm. The
requirement is that m∗ cannot be queried to the signing algorithm.
In any Gamei , we denote by Forgei the event
Verify(m∗ , σ ∗ , SKB , PKA ) = 1. By definition, we
have
−CMA
Pr[Forge0 ] = SuccEF
SSDV S, A .
• Game1 In this game, B set yA = g a and yB = g b
where g a , g b is the instance of the GDH problem.
Since a, b are randomly chosen, therefore
Pr[Forge1 ] = Pr[Forge0 ].
• Game2 In this game, B simulates the random oracle
H. For any query (mi , ri ) to the oracle H, B submits
(g a , g b , ri ) to the DDH oracle and DDH oracle will
tell B whether ri = g ab .
ab

1) ri = g , B checks the H-List
a. If there exists an item (mi , ⊥, σi , 1) in the
H-List (item of this form can be added into
the H-List during the signing queries), B
returns σi as the answer.
b. Otherwise, B chooses σi ∈R ZZ∗q such that
there is no item (·, ·, σi , ·) in the H-List. B
then adds (mi , ri , σi , 1) into the H-List and
returns σi as the answer.

• Game4 In this game, B simulates the verifying algorithm. After receiving A’s request of (mi , σi ), B
performs the followings:
1) If there is no item (·, ·, σi , ·) in the H-List, B
rejects (mi , σi ) as an invalid signature.
2) Else, there is an item (·, ·, σi , ·) in the H -List:
a. If this item has the form of (mi , ⊥, σi , 1)
or (mi , ri , σi , 1), B will accept it as a valid
signature.
b. Otherwise, B rejects it as an invalid signature.
This makes a difference only if (mi , σi ) is a valid signature, while σi is not queried from the H. Since,
H is uniformly distributed, this case happens with
1
probability less than 2` −qH
. Summing up for all
−qS
verifying queries, we get
Pr[Forge3 ] − Pr[Forge4 ] ≤

2`

qV
.
− qH − qS

After Game4 terminates, A outputs a valid signature
(m∗ , σ ∗ ) such that Verify(m∗ , σ ∗ , SKB , PKA ) = 1, that is
there is an item (·, ·, σ ∗ , ·) in the H-List. By the definition
of the EF-CMA adversary model, m∗ can not be queried
in the sign oracle, so σ ∗ is returned as the hash value
of A0 s query (m∗ , r∗ ). That is to say there is an item
(m∗ , r∗ , σ ∗ , 1) in the H-List and r∗ = g ab . Therefore, B
successfully solves an instance of the GDH problem with
probability:
−CMA
SuccGDH
≥ SuccEF
B
SSDV S, A −

qV
.
2` − qH − qS

2) Else ri 6= g ab , B chooses σi ∈R ZZ∗q such that
there is no item (·, ·, σi , ·) in the H-List. B then
a b
adds (mi , ri , σi , 0) into the H-List and returns Proof of Theorem 3: Given a random instance (g, g , g )
of the Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) problem , we will show
σi as the answer.
how B can use A to obtain the value of g ab with the help
In the random oracle model, this game is clearly iden- of Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Oracle. In the proof,
tical to the previous one. Hence
we regard the hash function as the random oracle H.
B will simulate all the oracles in the proof. In the
Pr[Forge2 ] = Pr[Forge1 ]
simulation, B will maintain a list which is called H-List
to record the hash queries and the corresponding values.
• Game3 In this game, B simulates the signing algo- We assume that A is well-behaved in the sense that A
rithm. After receiving A’s choice of the message mi , will never repeat the same queries in our simulation.
B checks the H-List:
• Game0 Consider an PSI-CMA adversary A with adP CI−CMA
vantage AdvSSDV
1) If there is an item (mi , ri , σi , 1) in the H-List
S, A . There are two possible signab
(which means ri = g ), B outputs σi as the
ers A0 and A1 with the corresponding secret key
xA0 , xA1 ∈ ZZ∗q and public key as yA0 = g xA0 , yA1 =
signature.
g xA1 (mod p). The designated verifier, Bob, also se2) Else, B chooses σi ∈R ZZ∗q such that there is
lects his secret key xB ∈ ZZ∗q and sets his public key
no item (·, ·, σi , ·) in the H-List. B then adds
as yB = g xB (mod p).
(m , ⊥, σ , 1) into the H-List and returns σ as
i

i

i

the signature.
Then A gets the value σi as the signature of mi . Of
course, this oracle simulates the signature perfectly,
so
Pr[Forge3 ] = Pr[Forge2 ].

The adversary A, with yA0 , yA1 and yB , can query
the random oracle H, the signature algorithm and
verify algorithm. A outputs a message m∗ . A
challenge signature is produced by flipping a coin
r ∈ {0, 1} and computing σ ∗ = Sign(m∗ , xAr , yB ).
Input σ ∗ , the adversary A outputs a bit r0 .
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Let qH , qS , qV denote the number of queries to the
H, signing algorithm and verifying algorithm. The
requirements are that m∗ cannot be queried to the
signing algorithm and (m∗ , σ ∗ ) cannot be queried to
the verifying algorithm.
In any Gamei , we denote by Guessi the event r = r0 .
By definition, we have
P SI−CMA
|2 Pr[Guess0 ] − 1| = AdvSSDV
S, A .

• Game1 In this game, B randomly chooses a0 ∈R ZZ∗q
0
and compute yA0 = g a , yA1 = g a · g a and yB = g b ,
a b
where g , g is the instance of GDH problem. Since
a, b, a0 are randomly chosen, therefore
Pr[Guess1 ] = Pr[Guess0 ].
• Game2 In this game, B simulates the random oracle H. There is a table H-List which maintains
all the queries and answers and consists of the item
(mi , ri , σi , signeri , coini ). Here (mi , ri ) is the input
of the H, σi is the output of H, signeri ∈ {A0 , A1 , ⊥}
and coini ∈ {0, 1}. For any query (mi , ri ) to the oracle H, B submits (g a , g b , ri ) to the DDH oracle and
DDH oracle will tell B whether ri = g ab .
1) If ri = g ab , B checks whether the H-List contains (mi , ⊥, σi , A0 , 1) (item has this form will
be added into the H-List during the simulation
of the sign algorithm). If it does,B outputs σi
as the answer. Else B chooses σi ∈R ZZ∗q such
that there is no item (·, ·, σi , ·, ·) in the H-List.
Then B adds (mi , ri , σi , A0 , 1) to the H-List and
outputs σi as the answer.
0

2) Else ri 6= g ab , then B submits (g a · g a , g b , ri )
to the DDH oracle and DDH oracle will tell B
0
whether ri = g (a+a )b .
0

a. If ri = g (a+a )b , B checks whether the HList contains (mi , ⊥, σi , A1 , 1) (item has
this form will be added into the H-List during the simulation of the sign algorithm). If
it does, B outputs σi as the answer.
b. Else B chooses σi ∈R ZZ∗q such that there
is no item (·, ·, σi , ·, ·) in the H-List. Then
B adds (mi , ri , σi , A1 , 1) to the H-List and
outputs σi as the answer.
0

3) Otherwise, ri 6= g ab and ri 6= g (a+a )b . If this
case happens, B chooses σi ∈R ZZ∗q such that
there is no item (·, ·, σi , ·, ·) in the H-List. Then
B adds (mi , ri , σi , ⊥, 0) to the H-List and outputs σi as the answer.
In the random oracle model, this game is clearly identical to the previous one. Hence
Pr[Guess2 ] = Pr[Guess1 ].

• Game3 In this game, B simulates the signing algorithm. After receiving A’s choice of the message mi
and the sender Ar (r ∈ {0, 1}), B performs:
1) If there is an item (mi , ri , σi , Ar , 1) in the HList, B outputs σi as the signature.
2) Else B chooses σi ∈R ZZ∗q such that there is no
item (·, ·, σi , ·, ·) in the H-List. Then B adds
(mi , ⊥, σi , Ar , 1) to the H-List and outputs σi
as the answer.
Of course, this oracle simulates the signature, so
Pr[Guess3 ] = Pr[Guess2 ].
• Game4 In this game, B simulates the verifying algorithm. After receiving A’s request of (mi , σi , Ar )
(r ∈ {0, 1}), B does:
1) If there is no item (·, ·, σi , ·, ·) in the H-List, B
rejects (mi , σi ) as an invalid signature.
2) Else, there is an item (·, ·, σj , ·, ·) in the H-List
such that σj = σi :
a. If this item has the form (mi , ⊥, σi , Ar , 1) or
(mi , ri , σi , Ar , 1), then B accepts (mi , σi ) as
a valid signature.
b. Otherwise, B rejects it as an invalid signature.
This makes a difference only if (mi , σi , Ar ) is a valid
signature, while σi is not queried from the H. Since,
H is uniformly distributed, this case happens with
probability less than 2` −q1H −qS . Summing up for all
verifying queries, we get
Pr[Guess3 ] − Pr[Guess4 ] ≤

qV
.
2` − qH − qS

• Game5 In this game, A outputs a message m∗ such
that m∗ is not queried to the singing algorithm. we
choose r ∈R {0, 1} and σ ∗ ∈R ZZ∗q such that there
is no item (·, ·, σ ∗ , ·, ·) in the H-List. Then we return (m∗ , σ ∗ ) to the adversary A. A now still can
query to the signing and verifying algorithm. Since
the challenge signature is randomly chosen it gives A
no information about r, in an information theoretic
sense, we have
Pr[Guess5 ] = 1/2.
The final game is indistinguishable from the previous one unless (m∗ , σ ∗ ) is queried to the verifying algorithm, m∗ is queried to the signing oracle,
0
(m∗ , g ab ) or (m∗ , g (a +a)b ) is queried to the H by
the adversary A. By the definition of the PSI-CMA
attack model, m∗ can not be queried to the signing oracle and (m∗ , σ ∗ ) cannot be queried to the
verifying algorithm. So the last case must happen,
that is to say there is an item (m∗ , r∗ , σ ∗ , A0 , 1) or
(m∗ , r∗ , σ ∗ , A1 , 1) in the H-List:
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1) If (m∗ , r∗ , σ ∗ , A0 , 1) is in the H-List, B outputs
r∗ as the solution of the GDH problem since
r∗ = g ab .
2) Else (m∗ , r∗ , σ ∗ , A1 , 1) is in the H-List, B out0
puts r∗ ·(g b )−a as the solution of the GDH prob0
0
0
lem since r∗ · (g b )−a = g (a+a )b · (g b )−a = g ab .
Therefore, B can obtain the solution of GDH problem. Therefore
| Pr[Guess5 ] − Pr[Guess4 ]| = SuccGDH
.
B
That is
SuccGDH
≥
B

1
qV
P SI−CMA
AdvSSDV
.
S, A − `
2
2 − qH − qS
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